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Executive Summary 
  The period under assessment (5 May 2013 – 7 November 2014) covers the 
first 20 months of Park Geun-hye’s presidency. In December 2012, Park beat 
her liberal rival, Moon Jae-in, by 51.6% to 48% in the South Korea’s 
presidential election. In doing so, she became the country’s first female 
president. Park heads an administration formed from the ruling conservative 
party, the recently renamed Saenuri Party.  
 
Since taking office in February 2013, Park has had a difficult time, one 
marked by the National Intelligence Service’s illegal intervention in the 
presidential election campaign, continuous problems in appointing senior staff 
to her administration, escalating tensions between North and South Korea as 
well as backtracking on key election pledges, such as her signature “economic 
democratization” agenda. Furthermore, the National Assembly was paralyzed 
for 150 days, until October 2014, following the Sewol ferry disaster in April 
2014 and the ensuing political struggle concerning a Sewol Law. 
 
Despite these problems, Park’s approval rating remained high and even rose 
during her first year in office to between 60 and 70%. However, her approval 
rating has since declined to 37% in December 2014, due to the accumulated 
disappointment in her leadership style and the lack of communication (survey 
by Gallup). 
 
The ruling Saenuri Party extended its absolute majority in the 300 seat 
National Assembly to 158 seats, following convincing by-election victories on 
30 July 2014. The unexpected defeat of the main opposition New Politics 
Alliance for Democracy (NPAD), an alliance formed only in March 2014 
between the Democratic Party and Ahn Cheol-soo’s independent camp, led to 
the resignation of the party’s co-leaders Ahn Cheol-soo and Kim Han-gil. 
Shocked by the defeat and resignation of its leaders, the NPAD has descended 
into chaos. 
 
Despite a moderate increase in public support for the president and a strong 
majority in the National Assembly, the first two years of Park’s administration 
have been underwhelming. Park has failed to deliver on many of her key 
election pledges, such as the Northeast Asian Peace and Cooperation Initiative, 
the creation of an ecological peace park inside the Korean Demilitarized Zone, 
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the Eurasia Initiative and her Creative Economy initiative. For some initiatives 
government officials have admitted problems in implementation due to the 
lack of comprehensive planning, while for other initiatives, for example the 
Creative Economy initiative, confusion surrounds their exact meaning, 
delaying their implementation.  
 
The policy approach of Park’s administration towards North Korea has also 
borne little fruit. Park advocates a step-by-step trust-building process with 
North Korea. This “trustpolitik” is represents a a middle way between the 
unreciprocated generosity of Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy of 1998 to 2007 
and the subsequent hard line taken by Lee Myung-bak. Many South Korean 
progressives are depicting Park’s policies towards North Korea as a 
fundamental departure from those of Lee. Yet, Park’s approach actually shows 
far greater policy continuity. For example, a strong deterrence remains a 
guiding principle. Given that these policy proposals, based on building trust, 
have fallen short of North Korea’s expectations, reconciliation efforts have run 
into an impasse and both sides have failed to find a way out of this deadlock. 
Consequently, there has been no improvement in the frozen inter-Korean 
relations. 
  
Key Challenges 
  The first two years of Park Geun-hye’s administration have been 
underwhelming. In particular, several key election pledges were abandoned, 
including economic democratization and welfare programs, while other 
election pledges remain poorly defined, including the Creative Economy 
initiative and the “trustpolitik” approach towards North Korea. Nonetheless, 
until November 2014, Park and her administration maintained relatively high 
approval ratings, while the popularity of the Saenuri Party rose. Much of this 
can attributed to the weakness of the opposition block, which has proven 
incapable of posing a real challenge to the government, as well as to the 
recently announced economic stimulus measures. However, Park’s 
administration and the Saenuri Party risk losing this public support if they fail 
to deliver on the promise of economic revival. 
 
Politically, the outlook for institutional and structural changes, aimed at 
deepening democracy in South Korea, is poor. The influence of money on 
politics, the regional character of parties and the personalization of politics are 
the biggest obstacles to deepening a relatively young democracy. The 
presidential election also highlighted the persistence of a regional divide in the 
country, with the southwest voting overwhelmingly for Park Geun-hye and the 
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conservative Saenuri Party, and the southeast voting for Moon Jae-in and the 
liberal Democratic Party. 
 
Economically, South Korea faces major uncertainties with respect to its 
export-oriented economy, due to the effect of the continuing global economic 
crisis and the fluctuating Chinese economy. Japan’s policy of quantitative 
easing has also raised concerns about a strengthening won and the effect of 
this on the competitiveness of South Korean firms compared to Japanese 
firms. Furthermore, the rise of the Chinese mobile phone brand Xiaomi, at the 
expense of the South Korean brand Samsung, indicates that South Korean 
firms are losing market share in Chinese markets. 
 
Domestically, household debts connected to a real estate bubble are a major 
challenge. To address this, the Park administration has launched a “happiness 
fund”, which aims to enable low-income families to partly write-off and/or 
restructure their mortgage. Other major problems include a comparably low 
employment rate, the high unemployment rate among young adults and the 
large share of precarious employment. Previous administrations failed to 
prevent increasing social inequality, while current welfare policies target the 
poor without addressing redistribution. The largely company-based labor 
unions’ focus on bread-and-butter issues for the core workforce has prevented 
them from working towards the development of genuine political alternatives 
to promote a fairer society. 
 
Another unaccomplished task is the divided economy, which is split between 
huge export-oriented business conglomerates and small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) in the service sector on whose work the conglomerates 
thrive. The Park administration tried to persuade the big conglomerates to 
follow a strategy of corporate social responsibility, supporting small suppliers 
and leaving certain markets to small companies. However, this strategy has 
had little success. It remains to be seen if the next administration is able to 
limit economic concentration and support the transition from primarily family-
owned conglomerates to more transparent and accountable businesses. 
 
With respect to foreign affairs, North Korea continues to be perceived as a 
major threat. The unpredictable and confrontational behavior of the North 
Korean regime, demonstrated by their recent provocations, led to a new low in 
North-South relations. In addition, the transition from Kim Jong Il to his son 
Kim Jong Eun added to this sense of uncertainty. It is not clear how Park’s 
trustpolitik agenda will improve relations with North Korea. Beyond the 
question of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, the future of South 
Korea’s role in global relations, which was a high priority under the previous 
Lee Myung-bak administration, remains unclear. Increasing tensions between 
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Park’s South Korea and Abe’s Japan, which lie in divisive nationalist domestic 
politics, present an obstacle to the development of international cooperation. 
Meanwhile, the increasing involvement of South Korean firms in foreign 
markets will increase the pressure on South Korean governments to engage in 
international negotiations, but it remains to be seen what policy approaches 
future administrations will take. 
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Policy Performance 
  
I. Economic Policies 
  
Economy 
Economic Policy 
Score: 7 
 According to OECD data, South Korea showed one of the OECD group’s 
strongest recoveries from the 2008 global recession. In the face of the global 
downturn since 2012, sluggish domestic demand, increasing household debt 
and a decline in job growth South Korea’s recovery has lost momentum. 
During 2013 Park Geun-hye’s first economic team sought to boost domestic 
demand through an extra budget worth 17.3 trillion won (.4 billion) and 
property market stimulus measures. Yet, despite the good performance of 
exports, the expansionary fiscal policy did not stimulate consumption and 
investment sufficiently to drive economic growth and revitalize the domestic 
economy. Sluggish economic growth raised concerns that South Korea’s 
economy could fall into a long-term slump, similar to that in Japan.  
 
In the second year of her presidency, Park abandoned her “economic 
democratization” agenda and switched to an agenda of economic 
revitalization. On the first anniversary of her inauguration in February 2014 
she unveiled a Three Year Plan for Economic Innovation with an ambitious 
“474” vision, targetting– a 4% GDP growth rate, 70% employment rate and a 
per capita income of $40,000. Her second economic team led by the Finance 
Minister Choi Kyung-hwan appointed in July 2014 has announced a $40 
billion stimulus package and put pressure on the Bank of South Korea to 
adjust its monetary stance in harmony with the pro-growth fiscal policy. 
Bowing to government pressure, the Bank of South Korea pulled back from its 
hawkish policy stance and, in August 2014, cut the targeted interest rate for 
the first time in 15 months. While this rate move by the central bank raised 
questions about its independence, the rate cut was welcomed by the Park 
administration as a necessary step towards reviving the housing market. A 
further rate cut followed in October 2014. At the same time, Park’s 
administration pushed ahead with housing market deregulation measures 
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including the relaxation of loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios. Yet, critics 
warned that the aggressive policies to prop up an anemic housing market could 
exacerbate the country’s heavy household debt burden. 
 
Citation:  
OECD, Economic Survey of Korea 2014, http://www.oecd.org/korea/economic-survey-korea.htm  
Economic Democratization: Needs of the Times, BusinessKorea, June 20, 2013, 
http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/article/152/economic-democratization-needs-times    
Park Warns South Korea: Change or Perish, The Diplomat, February 28, 2014, 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/park-warns-south-korea-change-or-perish/ 
 
  
Labor Markets 
Labor Market 
Policy 
Score: 7 
 Labor market policies have successfully kept the unemployment rate at about 
half the OECD average. The official jobless rate fell to 3.3% in Q3 2014 from 
3.7% in Q2 and 4.0% in Q1. The youth unemployment rate stood at 9.1% in 
Q3 2014, a decrease from 10.2% in Q2 and 11.7% in Q1. This comparatively 
good performance can be attributed to the effects of the large fiscal stimulus 
package, a currency devaluation that increased the competitiveness of exports 
and corporatist arrangements that reduced wage restraints and increased job 
security. 
 
On the other hand, labor market policies have been less successful in 
preventing the proliferation of precarious working conditions and irregular 
employment. This problem is particularly severe for young college graduates, 
who have been dubbed the “88 generation” since the late 2000s because they 
cannot get regular jobs and their first irregular job or internship typically pays 
about 880,000 won (approximately $800 dollars) a month. The overall 
employment rate of 64% remains below the OECD average due to low levels 
of employment among women and the ineffectiveness of government policies 
that target this problem. Consequently, many unemployed individuals are 
discouraged from looking for jobs and eventually exit the labor market.  
 
Park Geun-hye’s administration addressed the problem of low employment 
rate with a “roadmap to achieve an employment rate of 70% by 2017” 
announced in June 2013. It is likely to meet the 2014 target of 65.6% 
employment set by the roadmap. The youth employment rate (age 19-29), 
however, fell to 56.8% in September 2014, falling below the senior 
employment rate (age 60-64) of 57.2% for the first time. The ratio of irregular 
worker as a proportion of all workers declined from 32.6% to 32.4%. But total 
number of irregular workers increased to 6.08 million due to an increase in 
older workers paid by the hour (as of August 2014, Statistics Korea). 
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Citation:  
OECD, Employment Outlook 2011,  
http://www.oecd.org/document/46/0,3 746,en_2649_33729_40401454_1_1_1_1, 00.html 
 
OECD, Employment Outlook 2014, http://www.oecd.org/korea/EMO-KOR-EN.pdf  
 
Pres. Park’s dream of 70% employment still a long way off, The Hankyoreh, Jan. 16, 2014 
http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_business/620022.html 
 
  
Taxes 
Tax Policy 
Score: 7 
 The South Korean tax system is fairly effective in generating sufficient public 
revenues without weakening the competitive position of the national economy. 
South Korea has one of the lowest tax rates in the OECD. Although taxes on 
businesses are relatively high, compared to personal income taxes, they do 
reduce overall competitiveness. The corporate tax rate is relatively low, 
compared to the OECD average. Tax instruments are used to nurture foreign 
direct investment, research and design, and human resource development. Its 
main weakness, however, is equity. Compared to other OECD countries, the 
tax burden in South Korea is very low. As of 2012, tax revenues were 26.8% 
of GDP. 
 
Tax revenue has been growing slowly and is likely to increase in the future 
because social security contributions have increased relatively quickly since 
the middle of 1990 and will likely continue to do so. However, tax exemption 
continues to persist, as of 2011 the rate of tax exemption was a very high 
36.1%. As a result, income tax as a proportion of overall GDP is very low, 
only 3.6% compared to an OECD average of 8.4%. 
 
The strong reliance on value added tax gives the tax system an inequitable, 
regressive nature, and lessens its ability to improve equity. Major reasons for 
the weak income-tax base include: the relatively high number of self-
employed individuals, the low levels of income tax paid by this group and the 
sizable income-tax deduction for wages and salaries. However, Lee Myung-
bak’s administration had previously weakened the ability of the tax system to 
achieve equity by reducing progressive income taxes and real-estate taxes paid 
by the relatively wealthy. Since late 2011, the discussion has slightly shifted as 
the government failed to further deliver on tax reductions for the wealthy due 
to opposition. In January 2012, parliament increased taxes on those earning 
more than 300 million won (9,000). The so-called “Korean Buffet Tax” was 
passed three months before the parliamentary election against the opposition 
of many in the ruling party and the government.  
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On 6 August 2014, the Finance Ministry announced proposals for a reform of 
the tax system. A new corporate accumulated earnings tax was proposed on 
excess cash accumulated by large corporations whose equity capital exceeds 
50 billion won ( million) and corporations that are members of an enterprise 
group with restriction on mutual investment. The new tax is designed to 
encourage corporations to distribute profits as dividends to shareholders and 
reinvest cash towards the salary and wages of employees and investment, 
rather than accumulating and holding them in reserve. SMEs are exempt from 
this new tax regime. In September 2014 the government unveiled plans to 
raise residence tax and taxes on commercial vehicles and tobacco products. 
The proposed tax increases put a heavier burden on low income earners and 
will make distribution of tax responsibility more inequitable. At the same time, 
the government has decided to postpone taxation of religious groups for two 
years.  
 
Following an international trend, South Korea has signed tax treaties, such as 
the 2012 bilateral treaty with Switzerland, to gain access to the information of 
suspected tax dodgers. Taxes on problematic consumption items, such as 
energy or cigarettes, remain relatively low and the government has so far 
failed even to discuss an ecological tax reform. 
 
Citation:  
National Tax Service 2009 (Statistical yearbook of national tax), Korea.  
OECD, 2006, Tax Administration in OECD and Selected Non-OECD Countries. Comparative Information 
Series.  
Kim, Jyunghun, 2008: Tax policy in Korea: Recent changes and key issues, Seoul: Korea Institute of Public 
Finance, unpublished paper.  
OECD 2009, Reforming the tax system in Korea to promote economic growth and cope with rapid 
population ageing, http://www.oecd.org/topicdocumentli st/ 0,3448,en_33873108_33873555_1_1_1_1 
_37427,00.html 
“`Korean Buffett tax` passed despite ruling party chief`s opposition”, The Dong-A Ilbo, Jan 2, 2012 
“Tax cuts for wealthy shelved”, The Korea Times, Sep 7, 2011 
“Korean tax office to gain access to Swiss bank accounts”, The Korea Times, March 1, 2012  
“The government can’t run from the need to raise direct taxes”. The Hankyoreh, Sep 15, 2014 
 
  
Budgets 
Budgetary Policy 
Score: 7 
 South Korea’s national budgetary policies remain sound. South Korea 
continues to have one of the lowest levels of public debt and public 
expenditure among OECD countries, despite an increase in fiscal debt under 
the previous Lee Myung-bak administration. The ratio of public debt to GDP 
for 2013 was a relatively low 36.5%. From 2009, when South Korea recorded 
a budget deficit of 1% of GDP, and with the exception of 2013, when South 
Korea recorded a deficit of 0.4% of GDP, South Korea successfully 
maintained fiscal soundness. South Korea is expected to achieve a budget 
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surplus of 0.7% of GDP for 2015, despite a record spending plan announced 
on 18 September 2014. Huge amounts of government debts may be hidden in 
state-owned companies. According to the estimations of the Naumann 
Foundation in Seoul, the total amount of government debt could be about three 
times the official figure. 
 
The government has been remarkably pragmatic in abandoning what have 
traditionally been very conservative fiscal policies, implementing the OECD’s 
largest fiscal stimulus in an attempt to sustain economic growth. On the other 
hand, low overall government expenditure leaves room for doubt as to 
whether, amid a maturing economy and an aging society, the South Korean 
government is prepared to take more responsibility, particularly with respect to 
increasing spending for social security and education. The recent shift of 
government expenditure to construction projects might also create short-term 
growth at the expense of a long-term debt burden. Critiques that big 
construction projects like the Four Rivers Project were a waste of taxpayer 
money increased during Lee’s administration.  
 
At the local level, budgetary problems have become more prevalent due to 
prestige construction projects without many economic benefits. In 2010, 
Seongnam City became the first South Korean municipality to declare a 
moratorium on its debt payments. In 2012 and 2013 Incheon, South Korea’s 
third largest city, delayed paying monthly salaries of its employees as it 
teetered on the edge of fiscal collapse. As local government debt levels 
increase, the Park Geun-hyeadministration has proposed the introduction of a 
bankruptcy system for debt-ridden local governments, which would hold them 
responsible for fiscal deficits and force them to cut their debt. Moreover, rising 
welfare costs are causing further tensions between local and central 
government as a system of burden sharing is negotiated, which may further 
deteriorate fiscal sustainability. 
 
Citation:  
OECD 2010, Preparing fiscal consolidation, Paris, http://www.oecd.org/document/23/0,3 
343,en_2649_34595_44829143_1_1_1_1, 00.html  
OECD, OECD Economic Outlook No. 95, May 2014 
“In financial pinch, Incheon under pressure to downscale Asiad plan”, The Korea Times, April 4, 2012 
Klitz, Walter, “Korea kaempft mit dem Defizit”, Naumann Stiftung Seoul, 
http://www.freiheit.org/files/62/N_ 8_Korea_kaempft_mit_dem_Defizit.pdf 
“South Korea Plans Record 2015 Budget as Spending Jumps”, Bloomberg, Sep 18, 2014  
“Time bomb ticking on local government debt”, The Korea Times, March 31, 2014 
 
  
Research and Innovation 
R&I Policy 
Score: 8 
 The South Korean government invests heavily in research and design (R&D), 
particularly in fields which can be directly commercialized. Public spending 
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on research has substantially increased in recent years and accounted for 1% of 
GDP in 2011. The green growth policy is a good example of the government’s 
willingness to support domestic industry’s R&D of new products or 
production techniques. A further example is Park Geun-hye’s Creative 
Economy initiative. The newly formed Ministry of Science, ICT and Future 
Planning will spend a total of 8.5 trillion won (.1 billion) over the next five 
years to promote R&D in the information and communications technology 
(ICT) sector, a key target sector for the creative economy.  
 
The government also uses protectionist measures to help South Korean firms 
to develop indigenous technologies. One example of this infant-stage 
technology protection is the requirement that all mobile phones sold in South 
Korea must support a particular Korean internet platform. Such trade barriers 
have resulted in the complete dominance of Korean mobile-phone producers in 
the Korean market, because it is too expensive for foreign firms to design 
special models just for one country. The government started investing in a 
modern telecommunication infrastructure early, although more recently it’s 
lost its competitive advantage as other countries have caught up. The ever-
increasing dominance of large business conglomerates (“chaebol”) impedes 
the rise of SMEs and start-ups, which are often the source of new innovations 
(as opposed to incremental ones). Other weaknesses include a lack of high-
quality fundamental research, which is difficult to commercialize. In response, 
the government started funding a new Institute of Basic Science in 2012. 
South Korea has experienced a steady increase in the number of science 
articles or patents, but a fundamental change based in quality-oriented 
investment. Yet, the rate of commercialization is still low. 
 
Citation:  
OECD, OECD Review of Innovation Policies Korea 2009 
Institute of Basic Science, http://www.ibs.re.kr 
 
  
Global Financial System 
Stabilizing 
Global Financial 
Markets 
Score: 5 
 South Korea is a member of the G-20 and also one of the biggest gainers in the 
ongoing voting-share reform of the IMF and World Bank. However, so far 
South Korea plays only a very minor role in shaping the global financial 
architecture. Instead it is largely using self-help policies like the accumulation 
of currency reserves, currency management and capital controls to protect 
itself from global financial volatility. In addition, South Korea has held 
bilateral negotiations on, for example, currency swap agreements with the 
United States, Japan and China. While South Korea follows international 
standards on banking regulation, like the Basel capital adequacy requirements, 
it is playing a little role internationally in advancing them. However, South 
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Korea is expected to play a more active role in building the regional financial 
architecture for future negotiations for a Korea-China-Japan free trade area. 
 
Citation:  
“Dozens of Korean names in leaked data on tax havens: ICIJ”, The Korea Times, 24 April 2013 
 
  
II. Social Policies 
  
Education 
Education Policy 
Score: 8 
 South Korea’s tertiary education enrollment rate is very high. Education 
policies are hotly debated and are an important priority for the government. 
About 8% of GDP is spent on education institutions compared to an OECD 
average of 6.3%. However, only 4.9% of GDP is public expenditure, less than 
the 5.4% OECD average. Thus, much of the success of Korean education can 
be attributed to parents’ willingness to pay for education and not to public 
policies. Almost all parties involved in the field of higher education agree that 
a change in the South Korean system is both necessary and of high priority. 
There are many complaints about the curriculum content and the less creative 
teaching styles at South Korean schools and universities. Entrance exams are a 
particularly controversial issue, which critics see as a major cause of weak 
analytical and debating skills. Many advanced systems have been introduced 
for education reform, but cramming and rote learning are still favored over 
analytic skills, discussion and creativity. Social and cultural templates based 
on school ties are also hampering educational reform in a fundamental way. 
 
Citation:  
OECD, OECD in figures 2009  
OECD, Government at a Glance 2009  
Netherlands Organization for International Cooperation in Higher Education (2009), South Korea, The 
Hague. 
OECD, Education at Glance 2012, DOI: 10.1787/eag_highlights-2012-en 
 
  
Social Inclusion 
Social Inclusion 
Policy 
Score: 6 
 The gap between rich and poor has widened in the past 15 years, as well as 
over the assessment period, and criticism of the government’s lack of action 
on this issue is growing in strength. The South Korean welfare system is not 
designed to reduce inequality, while its capacity to prevent poverty is very 
limited given the extremely low level of social transfer payments. These small 
payments force unemployed individuals to accept any job offer, even if wages 
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are much lower than in their previous employment. This explains why South 
Korea has the highest share of working poor in the OECD. The welfare system 
also depends on family-based security, in which parents are willing to support 
their children even after completion of a university degree. Young people in 
particular still suffer from social exclusion. Gender equality is also still far 
below the OECD average. The elderly poverty rate is the highest among the 
OECD countries.  
 
It is common in South Korea for the more well-off members of a group 
(colleagues, friends, high-school alumni, etc.) to invite less-fortunate members 
out, so that these individuals can continue to participate in social activities. 
However, in South Korea’s increasingly money- and consumption-oriented 
society, poverty is becoming a source of shame, which partly explains the low 
levels of life satisfaction. Suicide rates are one of the highest in the world, 
particularly for the 60-plus generation. 
 
The Lee Myung-bak administration had shown little enthusiasm for the 
previous government’s plan to transform South Korea into a modern welfare 
state. Rather, Lee sought to solve social problems through high growth rates 
and job creation linked to public work programs and infrastructure projects. As 
the 2012 presidential election approached, the discussion slowly changed and, 
since her election, Park Geun-hye has put welfare policy high on her 
administration’s agenda with a pledge to expand social welfare programs. 
However, she was forced to backtrack on her most important election promise 
to introduce a monthly pension of 200,000 won (6), to citizens over 65 
regardless of income level, due to the huge fiscal burden. This shows 
government’s reluctance to support the poor and vulnerable elderly.   
 
 
The recent massive influx of North Korean defectors from low social classes 
has made the issue of their integration into South Korea’s workforce 
worrisome. Available data on the work integration of North Korean defectors 
casts a spotlight on this group’s marginalization in the primary labor market, 
as well as on other indicators of their poor level of work integration. 
 
Citation:  
Bidet, Eric, 2009: Social Capital and Work Integration of Migrants: The Case of North Korean Defectors in 
South Korea, Asian Perspective 33(2), 2009 
OECD, Society at a Glance 2011, http://www.oecd.org/korea/societyat aglance-asiapacificedition2011.htm  
OECD, Pension at a Glance 2013, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/pensions-at-a-
glance-2013_pension_glance-2013-en 
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Health 
Health Policy 
Score: 8 
 There were no major changes in the health care system during the assessment 
period. South Korea has a high-quality and inclusive medical system, and 
experienced the highest increase in life expectancy among OECD countries – 
an increase of 27 years to 79.8 years between 1960 and 2008. Health spending 
per person increased significantly between 2000 and 2011, the highest growth 
rate among OECD countries. Yet, total expenditure on health as proportion of 
GDP was 7.4% in 2011, below the OECD average of 9.3%. The public sector 
provides slightly more than half of all health care funding. The universal 
health insurance system has relatively low premiums, but high co-payments. 
South Koreans can freely choose doctors, including private practitioners, but 
coverage for medical procedures is narrower than in most European countries. 
Out of pocket payments account for 32% of all health expenditure. High co-
payments have the problematic effect that access to medical services depends 
on personal wealth. 
 
Citation:  
OECD, Society at a Glance 2011, http://www.oecd.org/korea/societyat aglance-asiapacificedition2011.htm 
OECD, Health Date 2013, Health at a glance 2013, http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/Health-at-a-
Glance-2013.pdf  
OECD, Health Data 2009 - Country notes Korea, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/ 10/38979986.pdf 
OECD, Health Data 2011 - Country notes Korea, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/10/ 38979986.pdf 
 
  
Families 
Family Policy 
Score: 5 
 South Korea has not been very effective in enabling women to combine 
parenting with participation in the labor market. This can be seen in the 
country’s low fertility rate as well as in women’s low labor-market 
participation rate. The traditional Confucian family values that view women as 
mothers and housewives remain strongly influential. High housing prices and 
high costs of education are the most important factors in young couples’ 
decision not to have children. In recent years, the government has been 
alarmed by the dramatic drop in fertility and various policies, such as free 
childcare services and flexible work-hours for working women, are being 
introduced or are under discussion. However, most policies adopted so far 
have proven to be inadequate in helping women combine employment and 
parenthood.  
 
The low fertility rate remains an unaddressed challenge. Cultural and 
socioeconomic factors, such as a gender pay gap that is the highest among 
OECD countries as well as pervasive social immobility, discourage women 
from entering into the workforce. As a result, the employment rate for female 
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graduates is lower than for male graduates, despite similar numbers of male 
and female college graduates. Furthermore, South Korea is the only country in 
the OECD where the employment rate of female college graduates is lower 
than that of women with only compulsory education. The 2013 Global Gender 
Gap Report by the World Economic Forum – which measures the gender gap 
with respect to economic, political, educational, and health-based criteria – 
ranked South Korea 111 out of 136 countries, a decrease on its rank in 2006 of 
92.  
 
There have also been more controversial reactions to the low fertility rate. For 
example, the government has started cracking down on abortions, which had 
been illegal in South Korea, but had been tolerated since the 1970s as means to 
reduce the birth rate. 
 
Citation:  
New York Times, 5 January 2010 
Kim Sangmook, 2008, Women and family-friendly policies in the Korean government, International Review 
of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 74, No. 3, 463-476  
The Global Gender Gap Report 2013, The World Economic Forum, 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GenderGap_Report_2013.pdf  
South Korea’s Failure to Support Working Women, The Diplomat, Aug 20, 2014, 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/south-koreas-failure-to-support-working-women/ 
 
  
Pensions 
Pension Policy 
Score: 6 
 The average age of South Korea’s population is increasing much faster than in 
many other OECD countries. The share of the population that is 65 years or 
older is expected to increase from 7% in 2000 to 37% in 2050. This relatively 
quick demographic shift is taking place in part because South Korea has been 
very successful in reducing infant mortality rates and increasing life 
expectancy, while failing to maintain birth rates near the replacement rate. 
Since 1996, the fertility rate has dropped from 1.6 babies per woman – just 
below the OECD average – to 1.2. South Korea now has the lowest birth rate 
among OECD countries and one of the lowest in the world. 
 
Old age remains a major source of poverty in South Korea, as pension 
payments are low and most elderly people today lack coverage under a 
national pension system that did not cover a large share of the workforce until 
its expansion in 1999. The government has also failed to enforce mandatory 
participation in the system, while many employers fail to register their 
employees for participation. Furthermore, most irregular workers and self-
employed are not covered by the system.  
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The national pension system is currently fiscally sustainable and needs only 
small subsidies. This is because the system is organized in the form of a 
pension fund and contributors currently far outnumber pension recipients. 
However, given the risks involved in pension funds, it is not clear what level 
of subsidies the fund will require once those who entered into the system since 
1999 retire. According to the first national pension financial review in 2003, 
the fund was projected to run out of money by 2047. Growing concerns about 
the long-term financial sustainability of the pension fund led to a drastic 
reform in 2007. The earnings replacement rate was reduced from 60% to 50% 
in 2008 and will be further reduced to 40% by 2028. The government hopes 
that pay promoting private pension plans can offset this reduction in the 
national pension benefit. Beginning in 2016, the government will make it 
mandatory for businesses with 300 or more employees to provide retirement 
pensions to their employees. This requirement will gradually be extended to all 
businesses by 2022.    
 
Three older and much smaller pension funds for government employees 
(insolvent since 2001), military personnel (insolvent since 1973) and teachers 
(expected to be insolvent from 2033 on) are already running deficits and have 
to be subsidized by the government. Given the low fertility rate and the aging 
population, the country’s pension funds will almost certainly need more 
subsidies in the future. Faced with the increasing fiscal burden of relatively 
generous civil servant pension schemes, Park Geun-hye has been pushing 
ahead with reform of the government employee pension plan to increase the 
pension age from 60 to 65 and reduce pension benefits.  
 
South Korea’s pension funds are vulnerable to government interference. For 
example, in 2008 the government told the National Pension Fund to invest a 
larger share of its assets in South Korean stocks, seeking to stabilize the stock 
market during the global financial crisis. Its financial sustainability is now 
hotly debated. 
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Integration 
Integration Policy 
Score: 5 
 Since the 1990s, South Korea has transformed itself into a society that attracts 
immigrants rather than a country from which immigrants leave. This change 
has been driven by an increasing demand for cheap labor, changes in 
generational composition of the population and a shortage of women in rural 
areas. In 2010, the total number of foreign nationals in South Korea reached 
1.2 million. 
 
Most migrants come from China, with Vietnam, the United States, Uzbekistan 
and Cambodia also contributing significantly. In August 2005, the parliament 
passed the Public Official Election Act, which enables foreign residents to 
vote in local elections. South Korea is currently the only Asian country which 
gives voting rights to non-citizens. In recent years South Korea has made it 
easier for migrants to receive permanent resident status and even citizenship, 
particularly for highly skilled migrants. In the 2012 parliamentary election, 
110,000 naturalized citizens were allowed to vote and Jasmin Lee of the 
Saenuri Party became the first naturalized member of the South Korean 
parliament. 
 
To apply for South Korean citizenship an individual must have resided in the 
country for more than five consecutive years, be legally an adult, have 
displayed good conduct, have the ability to support himself or herself on the 
basis of his or her own assets or skills (or be a dependent member of a family) 
and have basic knowledge befitting a South Korean national (such as an 
understanding of Korea’s language, customs and culture). In April 2010, the 
South Korean parliament also passed a law that allows dual citizenship. 
Another relatively serious integration issue concerns the social exclusion 
experienced by the foreign-born wives of Korean men (often from China, 
South-east and South Asia). This population has drastically increased in recent 
years – about 10% of all marriages in South Korea are international today, in 
the sense that either bride or groom is non-Korean. Such marriages often face 
cultural discrimination. 
 
Furthermore, cultural, education and social policies have yet to adapt to 
increasing immigration levels. While ethnic Koreans with foreign passports, 
foreign investors and highly educated foreigners are welcomed and treated 
favorably, Amnesty International reports that migrant blue-collar workers are 
often treated as “disposable labor.” From a legal perspective, migrant workers 
have very similar rights to native Korean employees, but these rights are 
routinely neglected by employers. While courts have offered some protection 
to migrant workers, the government has not pursued active enforcement 
measures against employers that exploit the precarious status of migrant 
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workers. In January 2012, the parliament unanimously passed a revision to 
allow migrant workers to more easily change their workplace. 
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Safe Living 
Safe Living 
Conditions 
Score: 9 
 Police statistics show a small increase in both violent crime and street crimes 
over the last few years, but the general sense of security remains high. The 
country has very strong gun control laws, making crimes involving firearms 
rare. There is no known terrorist activity in South Korea. Although a major 
concern that has not yet been effectively addressed is the spread of cyber-
crime, whose perpetrators take advantage of South Korea’s excellent 
broadband infrastructure and lax online security measures. The lax 
enforcement of traffic laws remains another issue, as South Korea has the 
second highest ratio of road fatalities among OECD countries, with 14.1 
deaths per 100,000. Every year 6,800 people die in road traffic accidents. 
Generally respect for and trust in the police is low. 
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Global Inequalities 
Global Social 
Policy 
Score: 6 
 South Korea has established itself as a new donor in the field of development 
cooperation and was admitted to the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee (OECD-DAC) in 2010. It put development on the 2010 G-20 
agenda and hosted the OECD High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 
2011. South Korea has massively increased its official development aid. In 
2011, for example, it increased its development aid budget by a remarkable 
13%. However, the level of overseas direct aid remains low at 0.12% of GNI. 
The quality of South Korean aid also remains relatively low. Untied aid is 
preferred by the OECD-DAC for the least developed countries but actually 
declined from 37% in 2009 to 27% in 2010. This is much less than the OECD 
average of 88%. Another weakness is the focus on bilateral as opposed to 
multilateral aid. South Korea has recently played a stronger role in agenda-
setting and overseas development assistance, but top priority is afforded to 
economic rather social issues (e.g. human rights issues). 
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In terms of a fair global trading system, South Korea has shown little initiative 
and instead focuses on negotiating a large number of preferential trade 
agreements with, among others, the European Union and the United States as 
well as many developing countries. 
 
Citation:  
OECD, KOREA Development Assistance Committee (DAC), PEER REVIEW 2012, 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-review s/Korea%20CRC%20-%20FINAL%2021%20JA N.pdf 
 
  
III. Enviromental Policies 
  
Environment 
Environmental 
Policy 
Score: 5 
 Environmental policies are currently insufficient to protect the environment or 
to preserve the sustainability of resources. In recent years contradictory trends 
have emerged. On the one hand, the previous Lee Myung-bak administration 
had put “green growth” at the center of its agenda, and environmental policies 
had entered the political mainstream. The Lee administration had strongly 
supported new technologies and had helped South Korean firms to develop 
“green” products, such as hybrid and electrical vehicles or LED-based lighting 
and displays. Yet, much of this so-called green growth was simply a new name 
for industrial and infrastructure policies. 
 
A considerable amount of the investment associated with this drive had been 
earmarked for the environmentally very controversial Four Rivers Project, 
which included the construction of artificial waterways and dams. Huge 
amounts of public funds were also used to develop, build and export new 
nuclear power plants. South Korea became one of the few countries that 
dramatically expanded its nuclear power generation after the 2011 Fukushima 
catastrophe.  
 
Park Geun-hye’s administration has since distanced itself from this “green 
growth” agenda, but it has not presented an alternative environmental policy 
agenda. Park’s administration has delayed a proposed tax on vehicle carbon 
emissions until 2020, amid pressure from domestic and U.S. car makers. 
Furthermore, the emissions trading scheme, which is expected to launch in 
2015, also suffers setback. 
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The local government in Seoul has expanded bike paths, although many of 
these paths are designed for recreational use and will have a marginal effect on 
reducing commuter traffic. Public transportation is also steadily improving 
with new subway lines and a high-speed railway connection to the airport 
under construction. South Korea also has a high level of recycling. However, 
in many other areas conservation efforts are stalling. For example, priority is 
still given to cars, many buildings are poorly insulated and energy use 
continues to be subsidized. Since 2010, the government has launched an effort 
to reduce excessive heating in the winter and excessive cooling in the summer. 
These efforts work in public environments, such as public buildings and 
transportation, but have not resulted in private individuals adopting more 
ecological lifestyles. 
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Global Environmental Protection 
Global 
Environmental 
Policy 
Score: 6 
 There has been little interest in moving South Korea from the developing 
country status it was accorded in the Kyoto protocol into the Annex 1 
category. South Korea has reported the largest increase in CO2 emissions 
since the 1990s among OECD countries. 
 
At the same time, the South Korean government is hosting two important 
international environmental organizations. The Global Green Growth Institute 
(GGGI) supports the efforts of developing countries to design environmental 
friendly policies and the Green Climate Fund (GCF) was established in 2012 
to fund these activities. 
 
GGGI and GCF have failed to show an expected performance due to the 
shortage of cooperation among concerned countries, poor governance structure 
and some financial scandals. 
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Quality of Democracy 
  
Electoral Processes 
Candidacy 
Procedures 
Score: 8 
 All election affairs are managed by the National Election Commission, an 
independent constitutional organ. Registration of candidates and parties at 
national, regional and local levels is done in a free and transparent manner. 
Independent candidates with no party affiliation are allowed to participate in 
national (excluding party lists), regional and local elections. Candidates can be 
nominated by political parties or by registered electors. Civil servants are not 
allowed to run for elected offices and have to resign if they wish to become a 
candidate. Deposit requirements for persons applying as candidates are 
relatively high, as are ages of eligibility for office. For example, deposits are 
300 million won for presidential, 50 million won for governmental and 15 
million won for parliamentary elections.  
 
Although the National Security Law allows state authorities to block 
registration of so called “left-wing,” “pro-North Korean” parties and 
candidates, there is no evidence that this had a real impact in the 2012 
parliamentary and presidential elections or the important Seoul mayoral 
election of 2011. However, the constitutional court in mid-December 2014 
ruled that the Unified Progressive Party undermined democracy and worked 
toward achieving North Korean-style socialism. The party, founded in late 
2011, had five lawmakers, all of whom were deprived of their seats. This was 
the first time a political party has been dissolved by a court or government 
order since 1958. 
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Media Access 
Score: 6 
 Candidates’ access to the media depends on the type of media. The print media 
remains dominated by three big conservative newspapers with a clear political 
bias. However, there are smaller newspapers that support the opposition. 
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Access to TV and radio is even higher, although government intervention 
increased under the previous Lee Myung-bak administration. There was some 
public discussion in 2012 on whether to exclude a progressive party candidate 
from the presidential election debate because she would have no chance of 
winning the elections. However, she was included until she resigned before the 
last debate. In general, concerns about media freedom in South Korea are 
growing. In early 2012, reporters from the three main TV channels – KBS, 
YTN, and MBC – went on strike to protest political interference. 
 
Blogging and social networks have played an important role in South Korean 
politics and in the country’s broader internet culture in recent years. The 
immensely controversial National Security Law also applies to online media. 
Nevertheless, South Korean society is one of the world’s most internet-active 
societies, with almost universal access to the internet and an increasing shift 
from the use of print media to online media (especially among the younger 
generation). This is why some argue that the obvious conservative bias of 
mainstream newspapers is less and less relevant as a factor in assessing fair 
media access during election campaigns. On the other hand, the Korea 
Communications Standards Commission and the National Election 
Commission have been trying to block accounts or fine online users for online 
comments critical of the government or the ruling party. However, some of 
these fines have since been overturned. 
 
Another limitation is the opaque character of South Korean election law 
concerning support for candidates during the election period, which can be up 
to 180 days before an election. According to some interpretations of Article 93 
of the election law, all public support for candidates or parties is illegal during 
that period. On 29 December 2011, the Korean Constitutional Court ruled that 
Article 93 was unconstitutional in restricting expression of opinions on the 
internet. However, it is still not clear how this ruling will affect other media or 
campaigning in general. 
 
Voting and 
Registrations 
Rights 
Score: 9 
 All adult citizens 19 years old or over are eligible to vote and voter registration 
is fair and effective. Citizens can appeal to the National Election Commission 
and the courts if they feel they have been discriminated against. National 
elections are national holidays, ensuring that all citizens are able to vote. 
Citizens who are currently serving prison time, have violated election laws or 
committed specified crimes while holding a public office are excluded from 
this right. Since 2009, overseas citizens aged 19 or older have been able to 
vote in presidential elections and in National Assembly general elections. 
Overseas citizens are defined as Korean citizens resident in foreign countries 
in which they are permanent residents or short-term visitors. 
 
SGI 2015 | 23  South Korea Report 
 
Citation:  
National Election Commission, Right to Vote and Eligibility for Election, 
http://www.nec.go.kr/nec_2009/engli sh/ National Election Commission, NEWS No.7 
 
Party Financing 
Score: 5 
 Party and campaign financing is a controversial topic in South Korea. Due to 
the low rate of fee-paying membership in political parties (on average less than 
0.1% of party members), candidates in elections have to spend huge amounts 
of money to hire supporters and place advertisements. Parties receive public 
subsidies according to their share of the vote in the most recent elections. 
However, a larger share of campaign financing comes from private donations. 
Nowadays some election candidates raise funds under a special investment 
(not donation) account, which has emerged as a new popular trend. Although 
election laws strictly regulate political contributions, efforts to make the 
political funding process more transparent have had only limited success. 
Many violations of the political funds law are revealed after almost every 
election and many elected officials or parliamentarians have lost their office or 
seats due to violations. The heavy penalties associated with breaking the 
political funds law have only had limited effect on the actual behavior of 
politicians and breaking the election law carries little stigma. 
Popular Decision-
Making 
Score: 5 
 Citizen referenda can be conducted at local and provincial levels and require 
support of at least 5% to 20% of voters and a turnout of at least 33%. Results 
are not legally binding. So far there have been five referenda. At national 
level, only the president can call a referendum (Article 72 of the Constitution). 
Since 2006, there have been binding recall votes at local level. However, the 
rate of success is very low. 
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Access to Information 
Media Freedom 
Score: 3 
 There is growing evidence that freedom of expression in South Korea has 
deteriorated since the beginning of Lee Myung-bak’s presidency in 2008 and 
throughout the first half of the Park Geun-hye administration. In the 2013 Press 
Freedom Index, published by Reporters Without Borders, South Korea ranked at 
50 out of 179 countries, falling six places from the 2011/12 ranking. South Korea 
also remains on the list of “countries under surveillance” for internet censorship. 
Defamation suits are a common way to prevent critical reporting. The number of 
web pages blocked or deleted at the request of the Korea Communications 
Standards Commission (KCSC) has significantly increased from about 57,000 in 
2013 to over 80,000. Monitoring of social media has also intensified. A special 
sub-committee on social media in 2011 set up by the KCSC asked for 6,400 
comments on SNS to be removed in 2013, up from 4,500 in 2012.  
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The latest cyberspace censorship scandal affected Kakao Talk, the nation’s 
most popular messenger service. The company has openly admitted its 
cooperation with government surveillance requests, after Jung Jin-woo, a 
member of the minor opposition Labor Party, revealed on 1 October 2014 that 
the prosecution recently examined his Kakao Talk conversations and the 
personal information of 3,000 of his acquaintances registered with the service. 
According to Kakao Talk, it received 2,131 requests for users’ information 
from the government with search warrants as well as 61 court-approved 
requests seeking to wiretap during the first half of 2014.  
 
After Park Geun-hye complained about ‘intolerable insults’ against her 
leadership on 16 September 2014, prosecutors swiftly set up an investigative 
team to tighten cyberspace monitoring for falsehoods or defamation. On 8 
October 2014, prosecutors indicted Japanese journalist and former Seoul 
bureau chief of The Sankei Shimbun Tatsuya Kato for defaming Park and 
barred him from leaving South Korea. The charges are linked to an article 
written by Kato and posted on Sankei Shimbun’s website on 3 August 2014 
that questioned the whereabouts of South Korean Park during the Sewol ferry 
accident of April 2014 that resulted in over 300 deaths.  
 
False or misleading reports by the major broadcasters about Sewol ferry 
incident and rescue operations have led to questions about political 
independence. In May 2014, a former editor-in-chief of the Korean 
Broadcasting System (KBS) caused turmoil by exposing the presidential 
office’s meddling in its news reporting. He alleged that Blue House demanded 
that coverage of the Sewol ferry disaster should be uncritical. To protest 
against the presidential office’s control of the media, KBS staff members went 
on a strike and 5,623 media workers issued a statement expressing their regret 
on how they reported the Sewol ferry disaster and apologized for not resisting 
pressure from government agencies. 
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Media Pluralism 
Score: 5 
 Despite some limitations, South Korea is one of few countries in East Asia 
with media pluralism. Its quality, however, depends on the type of media. The 
print media is dominated by three major newspapers: Chosun Ilbo, Dong-a 
Ilbo and Joong Ang Ilbo. The combined market share of these three outlets in 
2006 was 62.3%. Smaller alternative newspapers also exist. The major 
newspapers are politically conservative and business-friendly, partly because 
they depend to a very large degree on advertising revenues. For example, 
major newspapers and websites did not review or accept advertisements for 
the best-selling book of former Samsung chief counsel Kim Yong-chul, in 
which he accuses Samsung and Samsung Electronic Chairman Lee Kun-hee of 
corruption. However, as newspaper subscription rates continue to decline – 
dropping by almost 50% between 1996 and 2006 – the internet has 
increasingly become one of the most important sources of information for 
South Koreans, especially among younger people. 
 
There is more pluralism in the broadcasting sector due to the mix of public and 
private media. However, the diversity of political opinions in this arena is 
threatened by government influence over broadcasters’ personnel policies. In 
December 2011, in a controversial change of rules, the major newspapers were 
allowed to start their own cable TV channels. Channel A was founded by 
Dong-A Ilbo, TV Chosun by Chosun Ilbo, jTBC by JoongAng Ilbo and MBN 
by Maeil Business Newspaper. It is still not clear how the new cable channels 
will affect media plurality, but there is concern that the concentration within 
the newspaper sector will spread to TV as well. These cable TV channels are 
heavily influenced by the government in terms of re-approval examination. 
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Access to 
Government. 
Information 
Score: 6 
 The Act on Disclosure of Information by Public Agencies regulates access to 
government information. The Korean Public Information Disclosure System 
makes available all documents described by the act. Information can also be 
accessed online at the Online Data Release System. If an individual requests 
the disclosure of information, the agency in possession of that information 
must make a decision on the petition within 15 days. While this is a reasonable 
level of exception in theory, “national security” is often given a very wide 
scope for interpretation. 
 
Despite the sound legal regulations for information disclosure, there are many 
complaints about the policy’s practical implementation. Freedominfo.org 
reports that information disclosure requests are often rejected without proper 
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explanation. Complaints and litigation are possible in the wake of a failure to 
disclose information. 
 
Park Geun-hye unveiled the Government 3.0 Plan on 19 June 2013, pledging 
wide-ranging information disclosures on areas that were previously off-limits. 
The government said that by 2016, it will nearly quadruple the scope of 
administrative data releases from 16% to 60% of the available total source 
documents in areas like transport, climate, finance, and welfare. A new public 
data law to provide the legal grounds for the plan was enacted in July 2013. 
The Open Data Mediation Committee was created to help the public when the 
government or quasi-public agencies refuse to provide data or suspend access. 
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Civil Rights and Political Liberties 
Civil Rights 
Score: 5 
 Basic civil rights are protected by the constitution. Despite the establishment 
of the Human Rights Commission in 2001 and the effective performance of 
courts in protecting civil rights, human rights groups have criticized and even 
boycotted these processes for failing to consult civil society. Observers tend to 
agree that the human and civil rights situation has worsened since 2008. 
Amnesty International stated that there had been a “dramatic increase in the 
abuse of national security laws in a politically motivated attempt to silence 
debate.” 
 
The National Security Law remains in place, outlawing activities that could be 
interpreted as “benefiting or praising” North Korea. The authorities indicted 
102 people under the National Security Act in 2013, the highest number in 10 
years. Amnesty International’s 2013 report on South Korea names the case of 
Park Jeong-geun, a member of the Socialist Party of South Korea, who was 
sentenced to 10 months in prison in November 2012 for satirically re-tweeting 
a message from North Korea’s official Twitter account. Another case 
mentioned was of Kim Myeong-soo, who was sentenced to six months in 
prison for selling widely available books online with the “intention of 
endangering the security of the state.” He was later acquitted. 
 
Other serious issues include the inadequate rights enjoyed by migrant workers, 
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the widespread physical abuse of sex workers, the imprisonment of 
conscientious objectors, and the continuing use of the National Security Law 
to detain and imprison individuals believed to be sympathetic to North Korea 
or to be against South Korea’s government. An attempt to abolish the death 
penalty failed in parliament in February 2010 and in the same month the 
Constitutional Court ruled that the death penalty was constitutional. On a more 
positive note, a late 1997 moratorium on executions has remained in place and 
60 people are still on death row. 
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Political Liberties 
Score: 5 
 Political liberties are protected by the constitution, but infringements do take 
place. Freedom of opinion and of the press are constitutionally guaranteed, and 
freedom of association and assembly are respected in principle. Yet, recent 
illiberal trends raised big concerns. In November 2013 the government filed a 
claim with the Constitutional Court to dissolve the United Progressive Party 
(UPP), accusing it of pro-North Korean activities. The request to ban the UPP 
is the first in the history of the Constitutional Court, established in 1988. If 
ruled unconstitutional, the UPP will become the first political party to be 
forcefully dissolved since 1958, when the Progressive Party led by Cho Bong-
am was dissolved. Cho had been a strong challenger to the incumbent 
President Syngman Rhee and had been arrested on charges of espionage and 
violating the National Security Act. This unprecedented move followed a 
prosecution investigation into UPP lawmaker Lee Seok-ki in August 2013 on 
charges of treason. In February 2014, Lee Seok-Ki was found guilty of 
plotting an armed uprising in support of North Korea in the event of a war on 
the Korean Peninsula and was sentenced to 12 years in prison.   
 
Labor unions are allowed to operate in the private sector, but remain restricted 
in the public sector. Labor-union members are frequently imprisoned and fined 
for organizing “illegal strikes” or for “obstruction of business.” In December 
2013, in search of railway unionists, the police raided the headquarters of the 
Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) without a search warrant. It 
was the first time authorities had been sent into the KCTU since it was 
legalized in 1999. In October 2013 the government announced that the Korean 
Teachers and Education Workers Union’s (KTU) legal status was being 
revoked, accusing it of violating the clause of the teachers’ union law, which 
bans dismissed and retired teachers from their union membership. Since then a 
court battle continues over the KTU’s legal status.  
 
Businesses also sue labor unions for compensation for “lost profits” during 
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strikes. Civil servants are also limited in their political freedom. Another issue 
is the very opaque and vague election law that limits political activities 180 
days before elections. 
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Non-
discrimination 
Score: 5 
 Women remain underrepresented in almost all important fields in South 
Korea. The wage gap between men and women is on average 38%, the biggest 
such gap among OECD countries. The unequal treatment of South Korean 
women is reflected in various UNDP data studies. While South Korea ranked 
at 12 out of 47 in the UNDP’s 2013 Human Development Index, it only 
ranked at 27 out of 148 in the Gender Inequality Index. Discrimination against 
gays and lesbians remains pervasive. Discrimination against irregular workers 
and migrant workers is also frequent. In addition to discrimination at the 
workplace, many migrant workers have to submit to an HIV test in order to get 
a work visa.  
 
In April 2013, an attempt by liberal politicians to pass a comprehensive anti-
discrimination legislation failed, following two legislative failures in 2007 and 
2010. Resistance and oppositions to the proposed anti-discrimination bill came 
from different groups, two main political parties, religiously affiliated 
organizations, and employers’ associations.  
 
Discrimination against the disabled has lessened, although barrier-free 
entrances to buildings and public transportation services remain rare. The 
establishment of the National Human Rights Commission was an important 
step, but this organization is not part of the executive branch and has no direct 
enforcement authority. The enactment of the Disability Discrimination Act in 
April 2008 constituted another important step toward better protection against 
discrimination. According to official data from the NHRC, in 2011, a total of 
1,802 complaints about discrimination were filed with 874 concerning 
disability related discrimination. 
 
Citation:  
UNDP, Human Development Report 2013, http://www.undp.org/content/dam/und 
p/library/corporate/HDR/2013GlobalH DR/English/HDR2013%20Report%20Engli sh.pdf 
OECD, Gender Brief, March 2010, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/31/ 44720649.pdf 
The National Human Rights Commission of Korea, Annual Report 2011, 
http://www.humanrights.go.kr/englis h/publications/publications01_view. jsp 
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Rule of Law 
Legal Certainty 
Score: 7 
 There have been few changes in terms of legal certainty in the last two years, 
and signs of both improvement and deterioration can be found. On the one 
hand, there are fewer complaints from investors and businesses about 
government intervention, a trend that reflects the government’s generally 
business-friendly attitude. On the other hand, the unpredictability of 
prosecutors’ activities remains a problem. Unlike judges, prosecutors are not 
independent and there have been cases when they have used their power to 
harass political opponents, even though independent courts later found the 
accusations groundless. In South Korea’s “prosecutorial judicial system” this 
is particularly important, because it is the public prosecutor who initiates legal 
action. 
 
The most prominent case in recent years, in which critics argued that the 
prosecutor’s office acted as a “political weapon” of the executive branch, was 
the prosecution of former president Roh Moo-hyun. The biggest political 
scandal, since Park Geun-hye’s inauguration, concerns a feud between Chung 
Yoon-hoi and Park Ji-man. Chung was Park’s chief, while Park Ji-man is 
Park’s younger brother. The scandal alleges that Chung met with key aides to 
Park in an attempt to win a power struggle between himself and Park Ji-man. 
The publicity of this scandal opinion, the surrounding circumstances and the 
insinuation of shadow interference in state affairs reflects a deterioration of the 
rule of law and undermines public trust in the prosecutors. 
 
Citation:  
Joong Ang Daily 9 April 2010 
 
Judicial Review 
Score: 8 
 The South Korean judiciary is highly professionalized and fairly independent, 
though not totally free from governmental pressure. The court delivered an 
ambivalent verdict on former National Intelligence Service (NIS) chief Won 
Sei-hoon, who was indicted for mobilizing the spy agency to manipulate 
public opinion in support of Park Geun-hye’s 2012 presidential election 
campaign. The court ruled that the agency illegally interfered in politics on the 
orders of the former NIS director, but found Won and the other defendants not 
guilty of charges of violating the Public Official Election Act.   
 
State prosecutors are from time to time ordered to launch investigations, 
particularly targeting tax issues, aimed at intimidating political foes or other 
actors not toeing the line. The Constitutional Court has underlined its 
independence through a number of remarkable cases in which courts have 
ruled against the government. For example, a court acquitted a blogger called 
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“Minerva”, who had been accused by the government of damaging the 
nation’s credibility and destabilizing the currency market. However, there 
have also been cases that call the independence of the courts into question. For 
example, South Korean Supreme Court Justice Shin Young-chul used his 
position to influence the decisions of subordinate courts during the trials of 
protesters who had demonstrated against the import of US beef in 2008. Shin 
was referred to the court’s ethics commission, but did not step down.  
 
Under South Korea’s version of centralized constitutional review, the 
Constitutional Court is the only body with the power to declare a legal norm 
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, is responsible for 
reviewing ministerial and government decrees. However, in the past, there 
have been cases with little connection to ministerial or government decrees, in 
which the Supreme Court has also demanded the ability to rule on acts’ 
constitutionality and, hence, interfered with the Constitutional Court’s 
authority. This has contributed to legal battles between the constitutional and 
supreme courts on several occasions. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court 
has become a very effective guardian of the constitution since its 
establishment in 1989. The 19 December 2014 order for the Constitutional 
Court to dissolve the Unified Progressive Party, on the grounds that it was 
“pro-North Korea”, triggered a public debate on role of the Constitutional 
Court in South Korea. The Constitutional Court ruled in favor of the argument 
for security rather than political liberty. 
 
Citation:  
Croissant, Aurel (2010) Provisions, Practices and Performances of Constitutional Review in Democratizing 
East Asia, in: The Pacific Review (forthcoming).  
Kim, J. (2009) „Government Reform, Judicialization, and the Development of Public Law in the Republic 
of Korea’, in T. Ginsburg and A. H. Y. Chen (eds) Administrative Law and Governance in Asia: 
Comparative Perspectives, New York: Routledge, pp. 101-127.  
„Constitutional Court upholds the death penalty‟, The Hankyoreh, 27 February 2010, 
http://asiadeathpenalty.blogspot.co m/2010/02/south-korea-news-report-o n.html  
“NIS director found guilty of interfering in politics, but avoids more jail time”, The Hankyoreh, Sep 12, 
2014   
The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/19/south-korea-lefwing-unified-progressive-
party-pro-north, 19 December 2014 
 
Appointment of 
Justices 
Score: 5 
 The appointment process for justices of the Constitutional Court generally 
guarantees the court’s independence. Justices are exclusively appointed by 
different bodies without special majority requirements. Three of the nine 
justices are selected by the president, three by the National Assembly and 
three by the judiciary, while all nine are appointed by the president. By 
custom, the opposition nominates one of the three justices appointed by the 
National Assembly. The head of the court is chosen by the president with the 
consent of the National Assembly. Justices serve renewable terms of six years, 
with the exception of the chief justice. The process is formally transparent and 
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adequately covered by public media, although judicial appointments do not 
receive significant public attention. Courts below the Supreme Court are 
staffed by the national judiciary. Judges throughout the system must pass a 
rigorous training course including a two-year program and two-year 
apprenticeship. The Judicial Research and Training Institute performs all 
judicial training and only those who have passed the National Judicial 
Examination may receive appointments. 
 
Citation:  
Article 111 of the Korean Constitution  
Croissant, Aurel (2010) Provisions, Practices and Performances of Constitutional Review in Democratizing 
East Asia, in: The Pacific Review. 
 
Corruption 
Prevention 
Score: 5 
 Corruption remains a major problem in South Korea and government attempts 
to curb the problem are seen as mostly ineffective by the population. The 
enforcement of the OECD anti-bribery convention is evaluated as “moderate.” 
The Tax Justice Network ranks South Korea at 28 in its Financial Secrecy 
Index, indicating a relatively small role in illicit financial activities. According 
to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, (CPI), the 
perception of corruption in South Korea has increased relative to other 
countries. South Korea ranked 39 out of 177 countries in 2010, but ranked 46 
in 2013.   
 
On 29 February 2008, the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission 
(ACRC) was launched following the merger of the Ombudsman of Korea, the 
Korean Independent Commission against Corruption, and the Administrative 
Appeals Commission. Before February 2012, ACRC commissioners were 
appointed exclusively by the president, a provision that critics had argued 
undermined its independence. As a consequence of legislative reform, the 
president’s prerogative to appoint the members of the commission is now 
limited to nine out of 15 commissioners, whereas three of the remaining six 
(non-permanent) members of ACRC are appointed by parliament and three by 
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 
 
The ACRC has no power to investigate corruption scandals. The prosecutor’s 
offices that hold this power are not free of corruption in their own right. 
Proposals to create an independent institution to be in charge of corruption 
scandals involving high-ranking officials – including prosecutors – failed due 
to resistance on the part of the prosecutor’s office and some conservative 
politicians.  
 
In the aftermath of the Sewol ferry disaster in April 2014 in which the 
collusion between public officials and private enterprises has played a role the 
National Assembly has begun drafting new legislation that would impose 
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severe punishments on former government officials engaged in lobbying or 
other similar activities that take advantage of their network in the public sector 
for private gain. However, bickering over the details of the legislation has 
already begun and the debate is expected to be protracted. 
 
Citation:  
The Economist 2 February 2013, Pardon Me, http://www.economist.com/news/asia/ 21571192-departing-
president-proves -extravagantly-forgiving-pardon-me 
Act on Anti-Corruption and the Foundation of the Anti-Corruption & Civil Rights Commission, 2008, 
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Transparency International 2013, Country Page Korea, http://www.transparency.org/country #KOR 
“Ferry Tragedy: A Righteous and Overdue Rage Over Corruption”, The Diplomat, May 28, 2014 
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Governance 
  
I. Executive Capacity 
  
Strategic Capacity 
Strategic 
Planning 
Score: 7 
 Strategic planning remains an important factor in South Korean governance. 
The office of the president includes a senior secretary and two secretaries for 
the President for State Affairs. Given the strengthened position of the president 
and his comfortable majority in parliament, the political context for strategic 
planning improved under the previous Lee Myung-bak administration 
compared to its precedessor Roh’s administration. The Lee administration was 
sometimes more pragmatic and sometimes more ideological than previous 
administrations, but also more oriented toward the short term. Instead of being 
concerned with long-term goals, Lee viewed the government as operating in a 
similar manner to a company, reacting pragmatically to challenges in order to 
remain competitive in the process of economic globalization. Park Geun-hye’s 
administration, in contrast, has shifted priorities towards achieving “happiness 
for the people” and “economic revival.” 
 
Citation:  
Office of the President, Policy Goals, http://english.president.go.kr/gove rnment/goals/goals.php 
Office of the President, Special Policies, http://english.president.go.kr/gove rnment/special/special.php 
Office of the President, http://english.president.go.kr/gove rnment/office_president/office_pres ident.php 
 
Scholarly Advice 
Score: 6 
 Nongovernmental academic experts have considerable influence on 
government decision-making. Academic experts participate in diverse 
statutory advisory bodies established under the office of president and prime 
minister. Advisory commissions are usually dedicated to special issues of the 
president’s policy preferences. Many advisory commissions have been 
abolished after the change of government. The selection of scholars is very 
narrow and exclusive. The process of naming experts remains highly 
politicized and expert commission reports are utilized according to their 
political rather than their scholarly value. Beyond their work in commissions, 
scholars are often tapped to serve in government positions. 
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The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea, http://www.jinsil.go.kr/English/ind ex.asp  
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Interministerial Coordination 
GO Expertise 
Score: 8 
 South Korea’s presidential system has a dual executive structure, with the 
president serving both as head of state and head of government. The prime 
minister is clearly subordinate to the president and is not accountable to 
parliament. The presidential office, known as the Blue House, has the power 
and expertise to evaluate draft bills. As the real center of power in the South 
Korean government, the Blue House has divisions corresponding with the 
various line ministry responsibilities. It is supported in its oversight role by the 
prime minister’s office and its Government Performance Evaluation 
Committee as well as by public institutions, such as the Korea Institute of 
Public Administration. After taking office, Lee Myung-bak dramatically 
reduced Blue House staff, potentially weakening the office’s expertise. 
However, many of the initial redundancies were later reinstated, as problems 
with expertise and implementation emerged. Park Geun-hye’s administration 
has established two vice-prime ministers, one for the economy and one for 
society, education and culture, with the aim to promote inter-ministerial 
coordination. 
 
Citation:  
Government Performance Evaluation Committee, http://www.psec.go.kr  
The Korea Institute of Public Administration (KIPA), http://www.kipa.re.kr 
 
GO Gatekeeping 
Score: 9 
 There is extensive coordination between ministries, the prime minister’s office 
and the Blue House in the course of planning cabinet meetings. The president 
presides over regular cabinet meetings and can legally and de facto return any 
items envisaged for the meetings as he wishes. In practice this competence is 
limited only by the expertise of the Blue House and the relatively small size of 
the Blue House bureaucracy. Thus, the de facto ability to return issues depends 
on their political importance to the president. 
Line Ministries 
Score: 9 
 Executive power is concentrated in the president. Given Park Geun-hye’s 
preference for top-down, secretariat-centric decision-making the political 
system has become more hierarchical. There is less autonomy of line 
ministries and the relative position of the Blue House has been strengthened. 
Many line ministries have lost influence, been downsized or merged. The large 
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majority of issues are settled between the line ministries and the Blue House 
before cabinet meetings. Cabinet meetings are limited to an exchange of 
information, as most strategic decisions are made in the Blue House. But the 
relationship between the Blue House and the line ministries varies according 
to the policy cases and the political situation. The Blue House tries to 
dominate all ministries, but in some cases, for example during the president’s 
lame-duck period, the Blue House could not overcome the bureaucratic 
politics. The Blue House sometimes lacks knowledge and human capacity in 
certain policies. The Blue House gets involved with and coordinates certain 
policies through political dominance rather than administrative capability. 
 
Cabinet 
Committees 
Score: 7 
 The cabinet plays a relatively small role in the political process, as all 
important issues are discussed bilaterally between the Blue House and the 
relevant ministry. Committees are either permanent, such as the National 
Security Council, or created in response to a particular issue. Although the 
Blue House plays an increasingly active role in ensuring cooperation, the 
Office for Government Policy Coordination headed by Minister of the OPC 
under the prime minister’s office has played a major role in policy 
coordination for routine issues. 
 
Ministerial 
Bureaucracy 
Score: 7 
 Civil servants of different ministries regularly coordinate over commonly 
concerned policies. This coordination and cooperation among related civil 
servants across ministries can be either formal or informal, hierarchical or 
horizontal. Attitudes in the ministries are shaped by departmentalism that 
obstructs coordination. Different ministries compete with their policies for 
support and approval from the office of the president. There is also a clear 
hierarchy delineating the ministries. Civil servants in important ministries, 
such as the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, consider civil servants from 
other ministries, such as the labor ministry or the environment ministry, as 
“second tier.” 
 
Informal 
Coordination 
Score: 8 
 Most coordination between ministries is both formal and informal. Informal 
coordination is typically more effective. There is also a clear hierarchy 
structuring the ministries. Staffers at the newly created Ministry of Strategy 
and Finance see themselves as the elite among civil servants. However, the 
leading role of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance is defined by the 
president’s mandate. In addition, informal coordination processes tend to be 
plagued by nepotism and regional or peer-group loyalties, particularly among 
high-school and university alumni. There has been both cooperation and 
competition between the ministries. Informal networks with the president and 
powerful politicians work very effectively in specific policies. 
SGI 2015 | 36  South Korea Report 
 
  
Evidence-based Instruments 
RIA Application 
Score: 8 
 There were no changes in regulatory impact assessment (RIA) policy in the 
period under review. RIA has been mandatory for all new regulations since 
2005 and is applied to older regulations if they are strengthened in any way. 
RIAs assess proposals’ socioeconomic impacts and provide cost-benefit 
analyses. They mention the purpose and need for regulation, but focus on cost-
benefit analysis of the proposal. RIAs are focused on a cost-benefit analysis of 
proposed regulations. They do analyze alternative options and discuss 
potential pros and cons, but experts say that in practice these alternatives play 
little role in the drafting of final regulations. There is still a wide gray zone 
enabling regulatory organizations to decide in a discretionary fashion. The real 
implementation process of RIA is neither transparent nor predictable, which 
varies depending on the cases. RIA for environmental protection in the Four 
Rivers Project under the previous Lee Myung-bak administration turned out to 
be a failure, which was pushed by political power as a matter of form. 
 
Quality of RIA 
Process 
Score: 6 
 RIA committees are often criticized for not being fully autonomous and for 
being influenced by political and economic interests. Other criticisms 
mentioned by the OECD are the lack of time to carry out assessments, 
insufficient staff, and a lack of expertise and financial resources. Many civil 
servants in South Korea perceive RIA merely as a formality. Stakeholders are 
consulted in the process of RIA, which includes regular meetings with foreign 
chambers of commerce. 
 
Citation:  
OECD, 2007, OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform: Korea 2007 
Progress in Implementing Regulatory Reform 
 
Sustainability 
Check 
Score: 6 
 The assessment of sustainability implementations at policy level in South 
Korea is regulated by the Sustainability Development Act, which was enacted 
in July 2007, and overseen by the Presidential Commission on Sustainable 
Development. Its goal is to implement, promote, share, educate, network, 
monitor and make policy proposals on sustainable development. The three 
main principles of the act are: laying out national-level sustainable basic 
strategies every 20 years, laying out specific action plans every five years, and 
monitoring and assessing the implementations every two years. It considers 
quality of the environment, vulnerability to environmental degradation, 
environmental degradation level, social and institutional capacities to respond, 
and sharing of responsibility with the international community. Critics of the 
outgoing government argue that under the previous Lee Myung-bak 
administration’s RIAs, sustainability checks in the Four Rivers Project were 
not properly carried out. Park Geun-hye’s administration’s focus on economic 
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growth and deregulation has resulted in a lack of proper attention afforded to 
issues of sustainability. 
 
Citation:  
Ministry of Government Legislation, http://www.moleg.go.kr/english/korL awEng?pstSeq=57720 
Presidential Commission on Sustainable Development (PCSD), http://ncsd.go.kr:2020/index.asp 
 
  
Societal Consultation 
Negotiating 
Public Support 
Score: 3 
 Park Geun-Hye’s administration, like the previous Lee Myung-bak 
administration, governs in a hierarchical style. This represents an explicit 
rejection of the Roh administration’s vision of a “participatory democracy” 
and, in particular, follows a course of confrontation with labor unions. Park 
has maintained a hard line stance toward labor unions and civil society. A 
unilateral decision she made has created a perception of unpredictability and 
weakened the autonomy and activities of government organizations. Her lack 
of communication with opposition parties and the public triggered criticism 
even within her own Saenuri Party. Park has is perceived as a president who 
has held the fewest press conferences of any South Korean president on any 
policy any topic. 
 
Citation:  
E-People, http://www.epeople.go.kr 
 
  
Policy Communication 
Coherent 
Communication 
Score: 6 
 The government seeks to coordinate communication between ministries, but 
contradictions between government agency statements occasionally happen. 
Bureaucratic politics and turf rivalry take place at various levels of policy-
making and communication, but contradictions among ministries can be 
generally mediated by the Blue House and prime minister’s office. 
 
Citation:  
JoongAng Daily 12 April 2010 
 
  
Implementation 
Government 
Efficiency 
Score: 5 
 Since the presidential election, Park Geun-hye has enjoyed a clear mandate 
from the public and has maintained fairly high approval ratings. Furthermore, 
the ruling Saenuri Party has a comfortable majority in the National Assembly. 
However, the political capital afforded by the high approval rates along with 
strong public support for Saenuri Party has not been utilized. Park has 
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announced several big policy agendas, such as the Northeast Asian Peace and 
Cooperation Initiative, the creation of an ecology peace park within the 
Korean Demilitarized Zone, the Eurasia Initiative, and her Creative Economy 
initiative. Yet, so far, her administration has failed to deliver on these agendas. 
Government officials have admitted problems in implementation due to lack of 
comprehensive blueprints. In the past, 90 percent or more of the policies 
proposed by the government and approved by the National Assembly had been 
implemented. However, this percentage has fallen to 30 percent since 2010, 
with the remaining policies discarded. Park’s approval rate has recently 
declined to 39%. 
 
Citation:  
“S. Korea ‘bureaucracy risk’ derails economic innovation”, Maeil Business Newspaper, March 26, 2014 
“Election Win Puts Pressure on Park To Deliver”,  The Wall Street Journal, Aug 5, 2014. 
 
Ministerial 
Compliance 
Score: 10 
 Ministers in South Korea do not have their own political base and depend 
almost solely on the support of the president. The president appoints and 
dismisses ministers, and frequently reshuffles the cabinet. The average tenure 
of a minister has continuously declined over the past two decades. Under the 
previous Lee Myung-bak administration, it was about one year; this limits the 
independence of ministers. Public hearings of National Assembly for the 
candidates of ministerial positions should not be underestimated. Under Park 
Geun-hye’s administration, three candidates for the position of prime ministers 
did not survive the hearing and the media’s verification. 
Monitoring 
Ministries 
Score: 9 
 The offices of the president and the prime minister effectively monitor line 
ministry activities. The South Korean government utilizes e-government 
software (the Policy Task Management System) to monitor the 
implementation of policies in real time. However, political monitoring or 
pressure, rather than e-government, is more influential and the usual tool to 
supervise ministries. Ministries have little leeway in policy areas that are 
important to the president. In general, bureaucracy is organized in a very 
hierarchical way, but independence is stronger in areas that are comparatively 
less important to the president. 
Monitoring 
Agencies, 
Bureaucracies 
Score: 6 
 The ministries effectively monitor the activities of all executive agencies and 
the minister is responsible for compliance. Once again, the top-down structure 
of the government allows for effective monitoring. Agencies generally have 
autonomy with respect to day-to-day operations, but even these can 
occasionally be the subject of top-down interventions. However, there have 
been some cases when ministries fail to monitor the implementation activities 
of executive agencies. The series of bankruptcies and corruptions in small 
savings banks as well as mid-sized conglomerates since 2010 are exemplary 
cases of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance’s failure to effectively monitor 
the Financial Services Commission and Financial Supervisory Service.  
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The nuclear scandals concerning bribery and faked safety tests for critical 
plant equipment, which took place in late 2013, are further examples of 
supervisory failure. 
 
Citation:  
“Scandal in South Korea Over Nuclear Revelations”, The New York Times, Aug 3, 2013 
 
Task Funding 
Score: 4 
 While South Korea remains a unitary political system, a rather elaborate 
structure of provincial, district and neighborhood governments has been in 
place since 1995. Local and state governments play an important role in 
providing services to citizens, and account for about 15% and 45% of 
government spending respectively (according to the latest available data in 
2008). However, local and state governments have relatively little ability to 
raise their own revenue. As their own sources account for only 17% and 22% 
of national revenues respectively, most sub-national governments need 
substantial support from central government, particularly outside the Seoul 
region. In addition, local administrations lack sufficient manpower and central 
government staff are often delegated to sub-national authorities.  
 
Recently a new conflict between central and local governments arose over 
social welfare funding. Park Geun-hye’s election pledge to expand social 
welfare programs, without raising taxes, led to local government challenges to 
central government. In September 2014, local governments made the 
unprecedented move of challenging central government over the lack of 
support for welfare funding. It was the first time that local authorities had 
grouped together to challenge the central government. They criticized the 
central government for shifting the huge monetary burden, for implementing 
basic welfare programs, to regional governments, even though local 
governments were already deeply troubled financially and could not execute 
basic administrative affairs, like repairing roads or sewer systems. 
 
Citation:  
OECD, Government at a Glance 2009 
OECD, Government at a Glance 2011  
“High welfare-related costs stymie local governments”, Korea JoongAng Daily, Oct 14, 2014 
 
Constitutional 
Discretion 
Score: 5 
 While autonomous local governments are protected by the constitution, the 
constitution does not clearly define specific competencies and rights. A major 
obstacle to sub-national, self-governments is the lack of fiscal autonomy for 
local governments. Due to the very high dependence on transfer payments, 
most regional and local governments are vulnerable to interference by the 
central government. Furthermore, the share of transfer revenues (the sum of 
local allocation tax, national subsidies and local transfer tax) has risen from 
48% in 2004 to 58% in 2012. The reality of inadequate budgetary and 
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functional authority in many local areas, as well as the disproportionate 
influence of city and provincial authorities, often leaves local administrators 
and governments short on revenue and effective governing capacity. However, 
as local political autonomy takes root, local governments are trying to expand 
their executive authority as much as possible, leading to policy disputes with 
the central government. 
 
Citation:  
Joong-Ho Kook (2014), Does Local Autonomy Enhance the Autonomy in Local Public Finance? Evidence 
from the Case of Korea, http://www.akes.or.kr/eng/papers(2014)/127.full.pdf 
 
National 
Standards 
Score: 7 
 The Ministry of Public Administration and Security, created through a merger 
of earlier agencies, is in charge of ensuring that local governments maintain 
national minimum standards. However, many local governments, particularly 
in rural areas, have a much lower professional standard than the city 
government of Seoul or the central government. While the provision of basic 
services is similar in all regions, there is a huge difference in the provision of 
additional services, such as recreation facilities, between affluent (i.e. self-
sufficient) regions like Seoul or the southeast and less prosperous (i.e. 
dependent on transfer payments) regions in the southwest. 
  
Adaptablility 
Domestic 
Adaptability 
Score: 8 
 International and supranational developments that affect South Korea directly 
can trigger rapid and far-reaching change. For example, South Korea has 
reacted to the global financial and economic crisis with decisive action and 
massive government intervention. Global standards play a crucial role for the 
South Korean government. Reports and criticism issued by international 
organizations, such as the OECD or the IMF, or by partners, such as the 
United States or the European Union, are taken very seriously. Of course, 
there are many areas that show certain limitations to the full compliance, due 
to the informal practices and networks. The degree of adaptability, however, 
largely depends upon compatibility with domestic political goals. For 
example, the government is relatively less responsive to global standards in the 
area of labor rights or the reduction of non-tariff barriers. There is still a huge 
gap between form and substance in some areas which are heavily embedded in 
the political economy. 
 
However, the government declared its intention to increase overseas 
development aid in order to comply with the global standard in the near future. 
 
Citation:  
OECD, KOREA Development Assistance Committee (DAC) PEER REVIEW 2012, 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-review s/korea.htm 
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International 
Coordination 
Score: 7 
 One of the main goals of the previous Lee Myung-bak administration had been 
to improve the prestige and soft power of South Korea in global politics. The 
government has become considerably more active in international 
organizations. South Korea has increased its contribution to the World Bank 
and the IMF, and is an active participant in the G-20. South Korea is also 
increasing its efforts in development cooperation and became a member of the 
OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) in 2009. In 2011, 
South Korea hosted the OECD High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 
Busan. Yet the 2012 OECD-DAC peer review report of South Korea was quite 
critical of its shortcomings in meeting international standards for aid. For 
example, South Korea’s share of untied aid to the lowest-ranked developing 
countries was 27% in 2010 – much lower than the OECD average of 88%. 
 
While the country participated actively in the Copenhagen conference on 
climate change in 2009, its actual commitments to reduce greenhouse gases 
remain weak. Moreover, the government has also shown little enthusiasm for 
G-20 initiatives, proposing the international coordination of financial sector 
regulation and taxation. 
 
Citation:  
Kalinowski, Thomas and Hyekyung Cho. 2012. Korea’s search for a global role between hard economic 
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Organizational Reform 
Self-monitoring 
Score: 7 
 Unlike the previous Lee Myung-bak administration that came to office with a 
clear goal of streamlining the South Korean government and bureaucracy, the 
current Park Geun-hye administration has no clear vision of institutional 
reform. Under the Lee administration old institutions, procedures and attitudes 
were evaluated, and there was harsh criticism of real or perceived 
inefficiencies within the bureaucratic system.  
 
Park announced the “Government 3.0” agenda in 2013, which focuses on 
improving transparency in the government and supporting the Creative 
Economy initiative. Several major policies of the Park administration, such as 
the Creative Economy initiative and trustpolitik approach towards North 
Korea, remain unclear and poorly integrated into the institutionalize 
composition of South Korean policy-making. 
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Institutional 
Reform 
Score: 6 
 As each new president has reorganized the government’s structure according 
to their political visions and goals, government reorganization has occurred at 
the beginning of a new president’s term every five years. Park Geun-hye 
pushed changes to the government’s organizational layout, including the 
creation of a future-oriented super ministry in charge of science, information 
and communications, the revival of the fisheries and maritime affairs ministry, 
and the transfer of the foreign ministry’s trade negotiating functions to the 
commerce ministry. The Ministry of Public Administration and Security was 
renamed as the Ministry of Safety and Public Administration to place a greater 
focus on safety. Most experts, however, are concerned about these frequent 
changes and the effect they will have on the continuity and stability of state 
affairs.   
 
The most significant change in institutional arrangements was the passage of 
the National Assembly Advancement Act that went into effect in May 2012. 
The act requires the consent of three-fifths of lawmakers before a bill can be 
put up for a vote during a plenary session and limits the power of the assembly 
speaker to bring a bill to a vote. The legislation aimed at preventing the 
majority party from unilaterally passing controversial bills using its majority. 
That means that without cooperation between the ruling and main opposition 
parties, or a significant defection from the opposition bloc, the ruling party is 
incapable of passing legislation. The current ruling party, the Saenuri Party, 
has attributed deadlocks in the National Assembly to the act. One example was 
the legislative standstill from August until 30 September 2014 due to 
disagreements over the Sewol bill. The bill called for the appointment of an 
independent counsel and a 17 member panel to conduct an 18 month inquiry to 
bring charges against those responsible for the Sewol Ferry disaster in early 
2014.  
 
The main opposition party sat out all sessions at the Assembly in to protest the 
Saenuri Party’s stance on the bill. Finally, in early November 2014, parliament 
passed the bill. Nevertheless, charging that the National Assembly 
advancement act threatens the very roots of democracy by denying voting in 
the parliament. The Saenuri Party is currently negotiating to revise the act. 
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II. Executive Accountability 
  
Citizens’ Participatory Competence 
Policy 
Knowledge 
Score: 6 
 Many citizens are poorly informed about the details of most government 
policies, particularly concerning economic and social issues. The quality of 
information available is often limited, because political questions are often 
personalized and interpreted as power struggles between ambitious 
individuals. The political spectrum remains very narrow, limiting the scope of 
political discussion and making it hard for citizens to develop their own 
opinion. The low trust in government announcements and in the mainstream 
media provides fertile ground for the dissemination of rumors. There is also a 
difference between the generations. The generation that grew up during the 
Korean War filters information through an anti-communist lens. The 
generation socialized during the struggle for democracy is highly politicized 
and has a general mistrust of government, while the younger generation is less 
politicized and less informed about political issues. Under the Park 
administration, the gap in the perception of major issues between Blue House 
and mass public became wider. 
  
Legislative Actors’ Resources 
Parliamentary 
Resources 
Score: 5 
 Members of Parliament (MP) have a staff of nine, comprising four expert staff, 
three administrative staff and two interns. Given the large amount of topics 
covered by MPs, this staff is scarcely sufficient, but it is enough to cover MPs’ 
focus areas. The parliamentary library is one of the best libraries in South 
Korea. The National Assembly exerts the power of monitoring and supervising 
the administration through an existing system of investigation about national 
affairs, which can be regular or provisionary. Investigation about national 
affairs by National Assembly is a very powerful institution, but very skeptical 
on the effectiveness. The National Assembly monitors too many policy cases. 
Some lawmakers abuse and misuse this period to promote their own personal 
political performance in front of mass media. 
 
Obtaining 
Documents 
Score: 8 
 Parliamentary committees are legally able to obtain the documents they 
request from the government. The government is required to deliver these 
documents within 10 days of a request. However, documents pertaining to 
commercial information or certain aspects of national security can be withheld 
from the parliament. Lawmakers can also summon as witnesses the officials 
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concerned. Bureaucrats are sometimes reluctant to offer the documents and 
information in an effort to protect their organizational interests. 
Summoning 
Ministers 
Score: 9 
 The parliament has the constitutional right, and frequently exercises the right, 
to summon ministers to appear before parliamentary hearings. Regular 
investigation of government affairs by parliament is effective in monitoring 
ministers. While the parliament can summon and question ministers, the role 
of the minister in the South Korean system is relatively weak. The professional 
bureaucracy, however, is trained to be loyal to the president. In addition, the 
ruling party and ministers could make a collusive deal not to invite ministers 
or cancel the hearings on politically controversial issues. 
Summoning 
Experts 
Score: 8 
 Parliamentary committees are legally able to, and frequently do, invite experts 
to parliamentary hearings. However, there have been several cases where 
civilian experts have refused to attend these hearings. For example, where a 
hearing is dealing with a controversial issue, the ruling party tends to 
discourage experts from attending the hearing. 
Task Area 
Congruence 
Score: 9 
 The task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries mostly correspond. 
There are 16 standing committees, which examine bills and petitions falling 
under their respective jurisdictions, and perform other duties as prescribed by 
relevant laws. With the exception of the House Steering Committee and the 
Legislation and Judiciary Committee, the task areas of these parliamentary 
committees correspond with  respective ministries. As a consequence of the 
strong majoritarian tendency of the political system, committees dominated by 
the governing parties tend to be softer on the monitoring of ministries, whereas 
committees led by opposition parliamentarians are more confrontational. 
However, in general, the legislature is a “committee parliament” and the 
committees are quite effective and efficient. 
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Audit Office 
Score: 5 
 The audit office is a constitutional agency that is accountable to the president. 
It regularly reports to the parliament. The National Assembly regularly 
investigates the affairs of the audit office, as it does of other ministries. The 
demand to put the audit office under the leadership of National Assembly to 
strengthen the autonomy of the audit office from political power has gained 
more support. 
Ombuds Office 
Score: 5 
 The South Korean parliament does not have an ombudsman office. Under the 
previous Lee Myung-bak administration, the government’s ombudsman office 
was merged with the civil rights and anti-corruption agency into the Anti-
Corruption and Civil Rights Commission of Korea (ACRC). This commission 
is accountable to the president. People can petition the government directly 
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without approaching the parliament or the ombudsman. However, legislative 
reforms in 2012 strengthened the autonomy of the ACRC. 
 
In addition, the Foreign Investment Ombudsman (FIO) system was first 
introduced on 26 October 1999, under the Foreign Investment Promotion Act. 
The FIO is commissioned by the president on the recommendation of the 
Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy, via the deliberation of the Foreign 
Investment Committee. Until 2008, the FIO also headed the grievance 
settlement body, which was supporting the duties of the ombudsman through 
the collection and analysis of information concerning the problems foreign 
firms experience in South Korea. In addition, it also has the authority to 
request cooperation from the relevant administrative agencies and recommend 
the implementation of new policies to improve the foreign investment 
promotion system, and also carry out other necessary tasks to assist foreign-
invested companies in solving their grievances. 
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Media 
Media Reporting 
Score: 5 
 Taking into account not only freedom of the press, but also media pluralism 
and quality, the main problem with South Korean media is the low quality of 
many outlets in terms of their ability to serve as facilitators of public debate or 
civic culture. Part of the problem here is the country’s strong commercialism 
and associated weakness in political journalism. The main TV programs 
produce a mix of infotainment and quality information about government 
policies. Beginning in 2009, the Lee Myung-bak administration instituted a 
biweekly radio address in which Lee explained government policies. 
 
Evening news programs are extensive, but a large portion is devoted to various 
scandals and scoops. Deeper analysis of information exists, but is rare on 
television in comparison to public radio stations, such as KBS 1. In the last 
four years, TV and radio organizations have shifted their programming in the 
direction of entertainment and infotainment. Political programs have either 
been replaced or their teams shuffled. In December 2011, four new cable 
channels run by South Korea’s main newspapers began broadcasting. As 
commercial programs, they tend to favor infotainment. On the other hand, 
however, their connection with major newspapers may prove to be a good 
basis to produce quality information. Some mass media intentionally conceal 
or distort the information to help the president and ruling party in politically 
sensitive news. 
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Parties and Interest Associations 
Intra-party 
Democracy 
Score: 3 
 There is almost universal agreement among political scientists, political 
observers, politicians and the general public that political parties are one of the 
weakest links in South Korean democracy. In addition to their inchoate nature 
and lack of internal democracy, political parties have little ability to produce 
meaningful manifestos, political programs or alternative policy proposals. 
Party positions and candidacies for parliamentary seats are decided by 
powerful party elites. For the presidential race, parties have experimented with 
a primary system that uses text message and online polls, but the experiences 
have been rather mixed. Small reform-oriented groups of young lawmakers 
have recently made strong voices against party leadership, which could 
promote internal party democracy. The election platforms of individual 
candidates tend to be more important than party programs, but often avoid 
proposing coherent policies in favor of promises to achieve certain goals and 
secure certain benefits for a specific constituency. Strong regionalism further 
undermines the ability to form platforms based on political goals. 
Association 
Competence 
(Business) 
Score: 7 
 The business associations, such as the Korean Employers Federation and the 
Federation of Korean Industries, and labor-union umbrella groups, such as the 
Federation of Korean Trade Unions and the Korean Confederation of Trade 
Unions, have some expertise in developing policy proposals. They are 
supported by think tanks that provide scholarly advice. However, these groups 
are relatively weak in comparison to businesses and company-level trade 
unions. Some individual businesses, such as Samsung, LG and Hyundai, have 
their own think tanks that produce high-quality research, and are able to 
analyze and provide alternatives to government policies. Under the previous 
Lee Myung-bak administration, business organizations, individual companies 
and businessmen were in an advantageous position to articulate their interests. 
Association 
Compentence 
(Others) 
Score: 4 
 The rise of civil society organizations has been one of the most important political 
trends in Korea during the last decade. Some of the largest NGOs, such as the 
Korean Federation for Environmental Movement, the Citizen Coalition for 
Economic Justice and the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, have 
built up considerable competences in specialized fields, such as environmental 
policies, electoral reform and human rights. They provide reasonable policy 
proposals and are supported by a large group of academics and professionals. The 
majority of smaller NGOs remains focused on service provision and does not 
develop policy proposals. However, civil society and NGOs – especially those on 
the left of the center – had found it difficult to have any influence on decision-
making under the Lee Myung-bak administration. The Park Geun-hye 
administration has co-opted only politically sympathetic NGOs. 
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